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Abstract 
This paper starts from a recent case to study how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be 
improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the geographic market definition in the Merger 
Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The model is 
simulated to account for the changed multiproduct ownership structure after the merger. We show how 
our first two tests, a potential and an actual market power test, produce useful information, 
complementary to the traditional dominance principle adopted in the European Union. We also show 
how simulation analysis can provide useful additional information that goes beyond the traditional 
dominance principle. This is illustrated through two examples. First, we analyze the effects of 
efficiencies through cost savings. Second, we compare alternative merger sequences and emphasize 
the importance of evaluating the regional versus pan-European nature of a merger. These results 
contribute to the debate on the revision of current merger principles as they shed light on ways to 
improve actual practices. 
 
JEL Classification: L40, L41, L13, L62, C81. 
Keywords: merger analysis, competition policy, differentiated product markets, nested logit models. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
We are grateful to Svend Albaeck, Claude Crampes, Francisco-Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz, Patrick Rey, 
and to participants of the Competition Policy Seminar at IDEI, Toulouse, the ASSET 2001 Conference 
in Rethymnon, the 9th Annual WZB Conference on Industrial Organization in Berlin and the 
Competit ion Policy in the Information Economy Conference in Helsinki for their comments and 
insights. 
 
 
Contacts 
Marc Ivaldi 
Institut D’Economie Indutrielle 
Université de Toulouse 1 - Sciences Sociales 
Manufacture des Tabacs – 21, Allée de Brienne 
31000 – Toulouse, France 
tel: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 92 
fax: +33 (0)5 61 12 86 37 
ivaldi@cict.fr 
Frank Verboven 
Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics 
University of Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69 
B-3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32-16-326944 
Fax: +32-16-326732 
frank.verboven@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
 
 
                                                             
* University of Toulouse (IDEI, CEPR and EHESS) 
** University of Leuven and CEPR 
 2
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Merger policy has shown several interesting new developments over the past years. In the 
U.S., the policy principles have been modified to incorporate recent theoretical developments in 
Industrial Organization, such as the analysis of oligopoly behavior and the role of efficiencies. This 
evolution is illustrated by the various revisions of the Merger Guidelines. At the same time, U.S. 
policy practice has shown significant changes. In particular, there has been an increasing reliance on 
empirical methods and simulation analysis. In Europe, policy principles have evolved more slowly, in 
part because of the shorter experience with European merger cases. The principles of market definition 
have recently been made more in line with U.S. rules. But once the market is defined, the actual 
merger investigation is still largely based on the traditional criterion of dominance, including the 
assessment of the market shares and qualitative criteria such as the easy of entry and buyer power. 
This paper starts from a recent European case to show how merger analysis in Europe may be 
improved or complemented. Taking the geographic market definition from the Merger Decision as 
given, we formulate and estimate a suitable empirical oligopoly model with differentiated products. As 
an initial specification test, we verify whether our parameter estimates imply a price elasticity of total 
market demand consistent with industry sources. We then show how the model can be used to conduct 
a simulation analysis of the merger effects. 
We look at the merger case from several different angles. First, we propose a hypothetical 
market power test, which measures the extent to which unilateral price increases by the merging 
parties are profitable. This test has the advantage of imposing only weak assumptions on firm 
behavior. Second, we apply an actual market power test, which measures the actual price increases 
based on more specific assumptions on post-merger firm behavior. Third, we modify the actual market 
power test to account for the role of cost saving efficiencies. 
Finally, we consider a dynamic approach and show the importance of considering alternative 
possible merger sequences. More specifically, we compare sequential regional mergers with realistic 
pan-European alternatives. Regional mergers involve firms that belong to the same geographic area 
(e.g., Scandinavian countries), whereas pan-European mergers involve firms from different areas (e.g., 
one firm from the North and one from the South of Europe). In our application, we find that sequential 
pan-European mergers have significantly less anticompetitive effects than regional ones. The general 
lesson is that competition authorities should look forward when evaluating mergers and take into 
account possible future mergers and the way they may affect European integration. In this sense, the 
task for European competition policy authorities may be more involved than those in the U.S. 
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Our results imply that simulation analysis can provide useful information, complementary to 
the traditional dominance principle adopted in the European Union. They contribute to the debate on 
the revision of current merger principles as they shed light on the current approach. In particular this is 
apparent if one focuses attention to our first two tests (referring to potential and actual market power). 
On the one hand, we show that, in some circumstances that only an econometric model can precisely 
identify, the traditional market share investigation can provide a useful first indication on the expected 
anticompetitive effects. Because in the case considered here, we are not so far from satisfying these 
conditions, the ranking of the countries in terms of the merging firms’ joint market shares is broadly 
consistent with a ranking based on our simulation analysis. On the other hand, a simulation analysis 
has the potential to improve the merger assessment since it allows one to incorporate all elements and 
complexities in an integrated framework. For example, current European practice asks whether a 
strong market share of a remaining competitor may compensate for a large joint market share of the 
merging firms. A simulation analysis can address the role of the competitors’ market share in a 
theoretically consistent way. 
We also show how simulation analysis can provide useful additional information that goes 
beyond the current approach based on the traditional dominance principle. For example, a simulation 
analysis can help to quantify the required cost savings from the merger. Similarly, it can be used to 
draw consistent comparisons with alternative merger scenarios that may take place if the proposed 
merger is blocked. Such a comparison may especially be relevant in Europe, because of different 
effects from regional and pan-European mergers. To apply an extended simulation analysis, it would 
be necessary to revise the current merger rules, based on the dominance principle. 
There is an emerging literature on predicting merger effects based on a simulation analysis. 1 
Baker and Bresnahan already propose a first approach to this question in 1985. Later Hausman, 
Leonard and Zona (1992, 1994) advocate the use of econometric models in competition analysis, and 
more specifically the use of multi-level demand model. Werden and Froeb (1994) calibrate (but do not 
estimate) a logit model to measure the effects of alternative mergers among U.S. long distance 
carriers. Jayaratne and Shapiro (2000) calibrate a nested logit model to assess the effectiveness of 
partial divestitures as a remedy to the possible anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers. Nevo 
(2000) estimates a general random coefficient model to study merger effects in the U.S. ready-to-eat 
cereal industry. Pinkse and Slade (2002) follow a distance metric approach to study mergers in the 
brewing industry.2 All these papers have their own focus of analysis, depending on the specifics of the 
case. The particular focus in the present paper is on several aspects of the European dimension. We 
ask how current European merger practice may be improved through simulation analysis, with or 
without diverting from the current approach based on the dominance principle. We also provide an 
                                                             
1 Besides mergers, econometrics and statistical methods are now applied in many, if not all, domains of 
competition law. For a review, see Bishop and Walker (1999). See also the book edited by Slottje (1999). 
2 Advantages and inconveniences of the different types of modeling is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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economic justification for paying attention to the question whether a proposed merger, and possible 
further sequences, are of a regional or a pan-European nature. Detailed comparisons are possible, since 
the data are available for a large number of national markets. 
 
 
2. THE MERGER PROCESS IN PRACTICE 
 
 
2.1 General aspects of the merger process 
 
The process of evaluating mergers follows various stages. A first stage usually asks whether 
the notified merger falls within the jurisdiction of the merger authority. In the European Union this 
includes the question whether the merger has a European dimension. If this is not the case, then the 
investigation is left to the individual country or countries. 
The second stage considers the definition of the relevant market. The U.S. 1997 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines explicitly state that “the market definition focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors, i.e., possible consumer responses”. Supply substitution factors do not fall under the market 
definition process, but are considered elsewhere. Since 1982, the Guidelines specify their approach 
more precisely, based on the hypothetical market power test, or SSNIP-test. This principle states that 
the relevant market is a group of products and a geographic area such that a hypothetical, profit -
maximizing firm would impose a “small but significant and nontransitory increase in prices”. The 
profitability of such a price increase clearly depends on the extent of demand substitution. In a recent 
Notice (OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997), the European Commission has also set out its principles for market 
definition. Much in the spirit of U.S. practice, the focus is on demand substitution factors, with a 
reference to the SSNIP-test. “Small but significant” price increases are specified to be in the range of 
5-10 percent. The attitude towards supply substitution factors is ambiguous. While it is stated that 
supply substitution constraints are taken into account at “the assessment stage of competition 
analysis”, it is also stated that they may be taken into account when defining markets. 
To define the relevant market in practice, both the U.S. Guidelines and the European Notice 
distinguish between the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. For both 
dimensions the U.S. Guidelines describe a set of tools closely linked to the SSNIP-test. The tools set 
out in the European Notice correspond less clearly to this general principle. To assess the geographic 
dimension, the European Notice relies on “broad indications regarding the distribution of market 
shares of the parties and their competitors as well as a preliminary analysis of pricing and price 
differences at national and E.U. level”. As supplementary information, the Notice assesses the actual 
pattern of trade flows, and identifies obstacles to trade (e.g., the distribution system) and the 
possibility that these will be removed in the short term. To assess the product dimension, the Notice 
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proposes to use various qualitative indicators, the views of customers and competitors regarding the 
price effects, and evidence of substitution in the past, possibly based on estimated price elasticities. 
The third stage constitutes the actual merger investigation. In the U.S., this stage involves an 
analysis of market concentration and an investigation of potential adverse competitive effects, 
including the ease of entry.3 The anti-competitive effects from the mergers may be explicitly balanced 
against beneficial effects, in particular the presence of efficiencies. In the European Union, the actual 
merger investigation focuses on an investigation of anti-competitive effects, without explicitly 
assessing beneficial effects, such as potential efficiencies. The investigation amounts to assessing the 
presence of dominance. A dominant position is found when a firm (or a group of firms) would be able 
to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and consumers. Assessing 
dominance is based on criteria such as the joint market share of the merging firms, the strength of 
remaining competition, and potential competition. 
Neven, Nuttal and Seabright (1993) review the European merger decisions during the early 
nineties. They argue that the Commission has displayed little confidence in using the joint market 
share of the merging firms as the sole criterion. Their only consistent finding is that a joint market 
share of less than 25 percent is cleared within one month of notification. They also argue that the 
“strength” of the remaining competitors is most often used to complement information on the joint 
market shares. Finally, they observe the importance attached to buyer power and entry possibilities. 
 
2.2 Differentiated Products in U.S. merger analysis 
 
During the stage of the actual merger investigation the issue arises how markets with 
differentiated products should be treated. The European Merger Regulation does not consider this 
issue explicitly, in contrast to the U.S. Merger Guidelines. The Guidelines discuss the extent of 
product differentiation as one key determinant to identify a lessening of competition through unilateral 
effects (as opposed to coordinated interaction).4 According to the Guidelines, the merging firms may 
find substantial price elevations profitable, depending on the extent to which the lost sales will be 
diverted to the product of the merging partner. If the merging firms’ products are close substitutes 
relative to other products, the diversion will be particularly strong, making unilateral price increases 
more profitable. Interestingly, the Guidelines treat the observed market shares as an important 
indicator. According to the Guidelines, a significant share of consumers would be adversely affected 
if, among other things, the merging firms have a combined market share of at least 35 percent, and if a 
significant share of consumers of one merging firm’s product regard the others as a second choice. 
                                                             
3 Willig (1991) shows that, “for a market where the structure of demand was well represented by the logit model, 
(…) analysis of merger would be accurately based on market shares (…).” This remark is particularly acute to 
shed light on our analysis.  
4 The other determinant is the presence of capacity constraints. 
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Nevertheless, the Guidelines also state that market shares may both understate or overstate the 
competitive effects of concern. 
 Shapiro (1996) is more explicit about how the US antitrust agencies may conduct the actual 
merger investigation when products are differentiated. He distinguishes between four (pedagogical) 
steps in assessing the unilateral effects from a merger between brands “A” and “B”. The first step is 
devoted to the measurement of the diversion ratio, which provides the fraction of sales lost by brand 
“A” that are captured by brand “B”. Equivalently, it is the ratio of the cross-price elasticity of demand 
for “B” over the own price elasticity of demand for “A”. At the second step, based on the diversion 
ratio and merging firms’ current mark-ups, one calculates the post-merger price increase, assuming no 
synergies and no rival responses. The third step attempts to account for the effects of price and product 
responses by the rival firms. Finally the fourth step evaluates the potential presence of synergies that 
could reduce marginal costs. 
 Shapiro notes that the practical implementation of these steps depends on data availability. If 
there are detailed data on sales and prices, then the parameters of an oligopoly model for the industry 
can be estimated or calibrated, using assumptions about the structure of demand. That model can then 
be used to simulate the post-merger prices. The first two steps are thus effectively combined; the 
diversion ratio is implicitly subsumed in the analysis. The simulation approach has been applied 
several times in recent merger cases. 5 
If no detailed data are available, Shapiro proposes to employ some less sophisticated 
approaches to estimating unilateral competitive effects. Indeed the diversion ratio can be directly 
computed through survey data or company documents on the consumers’ first and second choices. In 
other cases, one may apply the result that, under certain assumptions, the market share of brand “B” 
relative to the market share of all brands except “A” may also be considered as a first proxy for the 
diversion ratio.6 For assessing the effect of the merger, one can obtain a measure of the expected post-
merger price by combining a measure of the diversion ratio, an evaluation of mark-ups and some 
structural assumptions. For example, under a constant elasticity demand, when firms are symmetric 
and sell only one product before merger, Shapiro recalls that the predicted price increase satisfies the 
following relation: 
 
*
1
p p mD
p m D
-
=
- -
, 
where p and p* are the pre-merger and post-merger prices, D is the diversion ratio and m is the pre-
merger markup.7 
 
                                                             
5 Shapiro (1996) discusses the proposed merger between Interstate Bakeries Corporation and the Continental 
Baking Company as an example where the simulation approach has been used. 
6 For example, if brand “A” has a market share of 25 percent and brand “B” a market share of 15 percent, one 
could compute the diversion ratio as 15/(100-25)=20 percent. This is an exact measure if (i) all brands compete 
symmetrically, and (ii) no consumers quit consuming, i.e. market demand is inelastic. 
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2.3 Summary 
 
The long history of antitrust practice in the U.S. contrasts with the relatively short experience 
in Europe. This inevitably has led to some differences, although in some respects there is a tendency 
of convergence. The stage of the market definition has become more or less comparable in the U.S. 
and in Europe, at least in principle. The SSNIP test, first adopted in the 1982 U.S. Merger Guidelines 
has recently also become part of the market definition in Europe. In practice, the market definition 
may still differ substantially, depending on the case. 
The stage of the actual merger investigation differs in several aspects. The U.S. makes an 
explicit balance between the anti-competitive effects from mergers against the beneficial effects, 
including efficiencies. A detailed list of tools is available, extending well beyond simple market share 
criteria and qualitative analysis. For differentiated product markets, simulation analysis has become 
recognized as a generalization of the traditional analysis based on market share criteria. In Europe, the 
actual investigation focuses on the likely anti-competitive effects from the merger. These are not 
balanced explicitly against beneficial effects. The analysis to assess dominance is currently based on 
market share criteria, combined with a traditional qualitative analysis. 
 
 
3. THE VOLVO-SCANIA MERGER 
 
 
 The proposed merger between Volvo and Scania was notified to the European Commission on 
22 September 1999 (Case No COMP/M. 1672). A Commission Decision on 15 March 2000 declared 
the merger incompatible with the Common Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In 
light of our analysis, we summarize in this section the relevant aspects of the investigation by the 
European Commission, based on the public version of the Decision. We do not aim to offer a full 
description of the arguments used in the Decision.8 We restrict attention to the analysis of the effects 
in the heavy trucks market. 9 
 
3.1 Market definition 
 
The analysis of the relevant product market is short, and does not refer to the SSNIP-test. The 
truck market is classified in three categories: light duty trucks (less than 6 tons), medium duty trucks 
(5-16 tons) and heavy duty trucks (more than 16 tons). The heavy truck market is further subdivided 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 Shapiro used this formula to obtain a rough sense of the likely price increase in the water jets merger. 
8 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1672_en.pdf. 
9 There was a separate analysis of the effects in the markets for buses and coaches. 
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into two segments: Rigid trucks and tractor trucks. Rigid trucks are integrated trucks, from which no 
semi-trailer can be detached. Tractor trucks are detachable. While it is recognized that rigids and 
tractors may not be fully substitutable, the overall conclusion is that the category of heavy trucks 
constitutes the single relevant market. Light and medium duty trucks are thus not included. No 
mention is made as to whether second hand trucks are part of the relevant market. 
 The analysis of the relevant geographic market is more detailed. Despite the views of the 
merging parties, the Commission concludes that the national markets constitute the relevant 
geographic market in the regions most affected. Several arguments are used to support this view. First, 
there are substantial price and markup differences across countries. Second, the models and technical 
configurations differ considerably, because of local consumer preferences and national technical 
requirements (e.g., the cab crash test in Sweden). Third, the selective and exclusive distribution system 
links the sales and after-sales services. The importance of profits from after-sales service may 
therefore induce dealers to charge higher prices to foreign customers. Finally, there are large variations 
in market shares across countries. 
 
3.2 Assessment 
 
The Commission Decision explicitly describes its methodology for assessing the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. It uses traditional market power proxies, i.e., market shares, 
supplemented by qualitative factors such as customer purchasing power and the likelihood of entry. 
The investigation is limited to the five countries where the creation of a dominant is found (Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Ireland), or where this is found to be likely (Denmark). 
For each of the five countries analyzed, the Commission takes the market shares as the starting 
point of the assessment. Table 1 gathers the market shares of the seven truck manufacturers. The table 
shows that the joint market share of Volvo and Scania is the largest in precisely the five countries 
where dominance is found (in the 49-91 percent range). This reveals that the Decision attached a high 
weight to the merging firms’ joint market share in assessing dominance. In fact, from the borderline 
countries, namely Denmark and Portugal, one may infer that the critical market share for concluding 
dominance is around 44-49 percent in this case. 
 In its market share analysis the Commission also stresses that the merging firms’ joint market 
share have remained stable, and showed no tendency to decline. Finally, the Commission points out 
the large difference between the joint market share of the merging parties and the market share of the 
largest remaining competitor in most of the five countries. 
The Commission supplements its market share analysis with qualitative factors. First, the extent of 
brand loyalty and the customer structure is considered. For most of the five investigated countries, the 
Commission finds indicators of considerable brand loyalty and of a dispersed customer structure, with 
the large majority of transport companies owned by small operators. The Commission concludes that 
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there is little customer purchasing power to compensate for the increased market power by the 
merging firms. Second, the likelihood of entry is assessed. Entry costs are calculated to be high, 
especially in light of the small size of the markets and the low population density. The cab crash test in  
Sweden is mentioned as an additional entry barrier. 
 
 
4. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
 
We specify an oligopoly model for the European heavy truck market that starts from the 
market definition adopted by the Commission. We thus assume geographically segmented markets and 
product differentiation in two segments: tractors and rigids. The specification closely follows the 
exposition of the nested logit model in Berry (1994), as extended to multiproduct firms by Verboven 
(1996). 
 
4.1 Consumers and demand 
 
A typical consumer is here a freight transportation company. There are N potential consumers, 
who may either buy one of J products (heavy trucks), 1,...,j J= , or otherwise choose the outside good 
0, e.g. a medium duty truck, a second hand truck, or another transport mode.10 The nested logit model 
classifies the products into G groups, and one additional group for the outside good. Products within 
the same group are closer substitutes than products from different groups. We consider two groups for 
heavy trucks: rigids (R) and tractors (T). The tree on Figure 1 depicts the consumer choice set. 11 Note 
that each group (buying a rigid truck or a tractor, or employing another transportation mean) 
corresponds to the use of a different logistic chain. 
The utility to consumer i from purchasing product j is given by: 
 
 ( )1ij j ig iju d z s e= + + - . (1) 
 
The first term, jd , is the mean valuation for product j, common to all consumers. It depends on the 
price of product j, jp , a vector jx  of observed characteristics of product j, and an error term jx  
reflecting unobserved characteristics: 
 
 j j j jx pd b a x= - + , (2) 
                                                             
10 Note that in this industry, each manufacturer produces one model per type of truck, which can come under 
many variants. 
11 This Figure and all subsequent tables are gathered at the end of the text. 
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where a  and b  are parameters to be estimated. 
The second and the third term in (1), igz  and ije , are random variables reflecting individual i 's 
deviation from the mean valuation. The term igz  is consumer i 's utility, common to all products 
belonging to group g, whereas the term ije  is consumer i 's utility, specific to product j. The parameter 
s  lies between 0 and 1 and measures the correlation of the consumers' utility across products 
belonging to the same group. If 1s = , there is a perfect correlation of preferences for products within 
the same group; so these products are perceived as perfect substitutes. As s  decreases, the correlation 
of preferences for products within same group decreases. If 0s = , there is no correlation of 
preferences: consumers are equally likely to switch to products in a different group as to products in 
the same group in response to a price increase. In this case, we have the standard logit model in which 
products compete symmetrically.12 
Each potential consumer i chooses the product j that maximizes utility. To compute the 
probability that a consumer chooses product j, the nested logit model assumes that the random 
variables igz  and ije  have distributions such that igz  and ( )1ig ijz s e+ -  have the extreme value 
distribution. Normalizing the mean utility level for the outside good to 0, i.e., 0d =0, the probability js  
that a potential consumer chooses product j is given by the following formula: 
 
 
( )( ) 1
1
1
exp 1
1
j g
j G
g
g
g
D
s
D D
s
s
d s -
-
=
-
=
+ å
, (3) 
 
where gD  is defined by: 
 
 ( )exp 1
g
g k
k G
D d s
Î
= é - ùë ûå . (4) 
 
For the model to be consistent with (random) utility maximization, a has to be positive and s  
has to lie between 0 and 1. At the aggregate level, the choice probability js  coincides with the market 
share of product j. The total quantity sold of product j, jq , is simply given by the probability that a 
potential consumer chooses product j times the total number of potential consumers N: 
 
 j jq s N= . (5) 
 
The net consumer surplus, CS, measures the attractiveness of the set of J+1 products in 
monetary terms, after subtracting the price consumers have to pay. It is given by the expected value of 
                                                             
12 In this case, the merger analysis can be based on market shares exclusively. See footnote 3. 
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the maximum of utilities. Using the assumptions of the nested logit model, the net consumer surplus 
CS equals (see, e.g., Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1993): 
 
 1
1
1
ln 1
G
g
g
CS D s
a
-
=
æ ö
= +ç ÷
è ø
å . (6) 
 
4.2 Pre-merger and post-merger pricing 
 
Each firm f produces a set fF  of products. Its profits are given by the sum of its operating 
profits for each product minus fixed costs K. The operating profits for product j equal the total sales of 
product j times the operating margin, i.e., the price jp  minus the (constant) marginal cost jc  for 
product j. Thus firm f’s profits are: 
 
 ( )
f
f j j j
j F
p c q Kp
Î
= - -å . (7) 
 
Producer surplus is simply the sum of these profits across firms. Total welfare is the sum of producer 
surplus and consumer surplus, defined earlier. 
Firms choose the prices of their products to maximize profits, given the prices set by the other 
firms. Each firm trades off two effects when considering an increase in price by one unit: (i) it 
increases profits proportional to the current sales level of the firm, (ii) it reduces sales, which lowers 
profits proportional to the current markup. The multiproduct firm takes into account that the lost sales 
on one product may be partly compensated by increased sales on its other products. The importance of 
this effect depends on the above discussed diversion ratio between the products, i.e., the fraction of the 
sales lost due a price increase that is recaptured by the other products owned by the firm. 
Pre-merger and post-merger pricing follow a similar logic. One simply needs to appropriately 
reinterpret the set of products fF  owned by the merged firm. If there are no other changes due to the 
merger (such as cost synergies), then the merged firm will always have an incentive to raise prices. 
This is because it takes into account the effect of a price increase on the sales of its merging partner. 
The magnitude of the price increase will depend on the diversion ratio. 
More formally, a multiproduct Nash equilibrium is given by the system of J necessary first-
order conditions.13 Following Verboven (1996), the first-order condition for product j can be written as 
 
 
( )( )
1
1 1j j f g f
p c
s s
s
a s s
-
= +
- - -
, (8) 
 
                                                             
13 In the following we assume that a Nash equilibrium exists. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) prove existence in a 
general discrete choice model, assuming single product firms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) prove existence for 
the nested logit model with multiproduct firms, assuming symmetry. 
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where f gs  is the market share of firm f in group g, and fs  is the market share of firm f in the total 
market. Intuitively, the price for product j is equal to marginal cost plus a markup term. The markup 
term depends on product j ‘s own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticities with respect to the 
other products owned by the firm. The solution given by Equation (8) shows the role of the market 
shares and the substitution parameter s . 
The marginal cost for product j is constant and depends on a vector jw  of observed 
characteristics of product j, and an error term jw , reflecting unobserved characteristics: 
 
 ( )expj j jc w g w= + , (9) 
 
where g  is a parameter vector to be estimated. 
 
4.3 Specification and estimation 
 
We estimate the demand equation (3) and the pre-merger pricing equation (8), using the 
expressions for the mean utility (2) and marginal cost (9). The parameters to be estimated are a , s ,  
b  and g . The observed variables are prices, jp , sales, jq , and the characteristics, jx  and jw , 
influencing the mean valuation and marginal cost. The total number of potential consumers N is 
assumed to be known. The econometric error terms are the unobserved characteristics, x j  and jw . 
They enter nonlinearly in both the demand and the pricing equations (3) and (8). The pricing equation 
can be easily log-linearized. To linearize the demand equation, we follow the transformation 
procedure proposed by Berry (1994). We estimate the transformed demand and the pricing equation 
simultaneously using nonlinear three-stage least squares. This estimator takes into account cross-
equation parameter restrictions and possible correlation between the error terms x j  and w j . It also 
takes into account the endogeneity of prices and sales through instruments. 
To estimate the model we use a panel of 16 countries in the E.E.A. over 2 years (1997 and 
1998). Prices are list prices of a base model. Sales are total sales for the model range.14 The 
characteristics vectors jx  and jw  contain the same exogenous variables: Horsepower, a dummy 
variable to denote “tractor”, a set of dummy variables to measure country-specific effects, a set of 
dummy variables to measure firm-specific effects, and an interaction dummy variable to indicate 
whether the product is produced by a domestic firm.15 To account for endogeneity, we use the 
following variables as instruments in the demand and pricing equation of prices and sales): The sum of 
                                                             
14 These data have been obtained from a survey run by the Merger Task Force under the conduct of the authors. 
The values of market shares obtained by that way are very close to the ones presented in Table 1. 
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horsepower of all competing products in a country per year, and the sum of horsepower of all 
competing products in a group (tractor or rigid group). 
The total number of potential consumers N is set equal to the average total sales in the country 
over 1997-1998, multiplied by a potential market factor 1+r. We consider two scenarios: 0.5r =  and 
3.0r = . In other words, we assume that the total potential market is fifty percent to three hundred 
percent larger than the average annual sales. It is an implicit assumption on the size of the market 
share of the outside good. We return on this assumption below. 
Most parameter estimates for the characteristics (in the vectors g  and b ) are significant with 
the expected sign, and robust whether 0.5r =  or 3.0r =  is assumed. For example, the estimates of the 
firm-specific fixed effects show that a firm with a higher marginal cost also tends to have a higher 
mean valuation. Domestic firms also receive a higher mean valuation. They experience only an 
insignificant cost advantage over foreign firms.16 Horsepower has a positive and significant effect on 
marginal cost; it has a negative but insignificant effect on the mean valuation by consumers. To 
interpret this, note that the horsepower variable may not only capture truck performance. It may also 
reflect unmeasured maintenance and operating costs for truck drivers, which do not affect marginal 
cost, but negatively affect the mean valuation. As a result, the effect of horsepower on marginal cost is 
unambiguously positive, whereas its effect on the mean valuation may be positive or negative.17 
Most relevant for our purposes are the estimates of the parameters a  and s , which determine 
the estimated price elasticities and markups. Table 2 shows the estimates for the two assumed values 
of the potential market factor ( 0.5r =  and 3.0r = ). Note that these estimates satisfy the necessary 
restrictions for the nested logit model to be consistent with random utility maximization. Consumers 
respond to a price increase by reducing demand ( 0a ³ ). The hypothesis that trucks within the same 
group (rigid or tractor) are perfect substitutes can be rejected, since s  is significantly less than 1. The 
hypothesis of symmetric competition between trucks from the same group and trucks from different 
groups cannot be rejected, yet the 95 percent confidence interval for s  suggests that there is 
segmentation between segments. The estimated marginal costs jc  and mean valuations jd  implied by 
the estimates are positive for all products, and usually of a reasonable order of magnitude. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
15 More specifically, DAF is a domestic firm in the Netherlands, MAN. and Daimler are domestic firms in 
Germany, Renault is a domestic firm in France, Iveco is a domestic firm in Italy, and Volvo and Scania are 
treated as domestic firms in the Nordic countries. 
16 A cost advantage for domestic firms may occur for example because of lower transportation costs. 
17 The literature on the automobile market usually finds a significant and positive effect of horsepower on the 
mean valuation term. First, this literature may better control for maintenance costs in the mean valuation term, 
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5. MERGER ANALYSIS 
 
 
We now show how the econometric model can be used to assess merger effects. We begin 
with a specification test to see whether our estimates imply a price elasticity of total market demand 
consistent with industry sources. We then consider two tests, a potential and an actual market power 
test, to see how simulation analysis can provide useful information, complementary to the traditional 
dominance principle. We then go beyond the current policy principles in Europe by considering two 
extensions: The role of efficiencies and a comparison between a regional and a pan-European merger 
scenario. 
 
5.1 Definition of the relevant market 
 
The econometric model considered two different scenarios for the potential market factor r.  
The first scenario has a potential market factor 0.5r = , i.e., a potential market size that is fifty percent 
larger than the actual average market size during 1997-98. The second scenario has 3.0r = , i.e., a 
potential market size that is four times larger than the actual market size (measured by the average 
annual shipments). A preliminary question before assessing the merger effects is which of these two 
scenarios is the most plausible. 
To address this question, note that there is a close correspondence between the potential 
market factor r and the price elasticity of total market demand. When r is large the outside good is an 
important substitute, so that the price elasticity of total market demand is large.18 In principle, the 
parameter r can thus be estimated, just as one can estimate the price elasticity of total market demand. 
In practice, however, the identification of r requires data for a sufficiently large time horizon. 
Since our product-level data set covers only two years, estimation of r proved difficult. 
Limited data are likely to be present in most other merger cases, since decisions need to be made fast, 
especially in Europe. A suitable alternative approach is therefore to make use of supplementary 
information. In particular, one may make use of available evidence on the price elasticity or estimate it 
based on long-term aggregate data. This may be confronted with the elasticity implied by alternative 
values of r. In our application, we looked for existing evidence on the price elasticity of market 
demand. The European Commission cites industry sources that have found the price elasticity to be 
around –0.9 for heavy trucks above 16 tons, and –0.4 for trucks above 24 tons. We confront these 
estimates with the price elasticities implied by our two alternative scenarios. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
see, e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) who include fuel efficiency. Second, consumers of cars may put a 
higher weight on the performance of a car relative to the implied higher maintenance costs. 
18 For example, in the simple logit model ( 0s = ) the price elasticity of market demand, measured at identical 
prices p, is equal to ( )1r r pa- +é ùë û . 
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The results are displayed in Table 3. In the first scenario, the implied price elasticity of market 
demand mostly varies between –0.5 and –0.6 depending on the country. In the second scenario, it 
varies between –1.0 and –1.5. These values have a similar order of magnitude as the estimates from 
the industry sources. To take a conservative approach (in the sense that a larger potential market size 
favors merging firms), we focus on the second scenario in our merger analysis. 
 
5.2 Potential market power test 
 
Our first test is a potential market power test. This test computes the profitability of unilateral 
and nontrivial price increases by the merging firms. More specifically, we consider price increases by 
5, 10 and 25 percent. The elements of this test are defined as follows: 
 
- Profitability. The profitability of a price increase depends on the diversion ratio and the pre-
merger markups. The greater is the diversion ratio between the two merging firms’ products, 
the more the merging partners can recapture each other’s lost sales from the price increase. 
The larger are the markups, the more the partners gain from the recaptured sales. 
- Unilateral price increase: The rival firms are assumed not to respond to the price increase, 
e.g., by partially raising their prices as well.  
- Nontrivial price increase: A small price increase after the merger would necessarily be 
profitable. It has a negative but negligible effect on the product’s own profits, and a positive 
and non-negligible effect on the profits of the merging partner’s profit. 19 In contrast, a 
sufficiently large price increase eventually becomes unprofitable: The negative own-profit 
effect becomes substantial and at some point outweighs the positive profit effect of the 
merging partner. 
 
Note that the test is related to the discussed SSNIP test, yet the focus is different. The SSNIP-
test asks how many firms are needed to make a given price increase profitable, for the purpose of 
defining the relevant antitrust market. Our potential market power test asks whether the two merging 
firms can profitably raise prices by alternative amounts. The purpose is here to examine the potential 
of increased unilateral market power. 
Table 4 shows the (normalized) percentage profit changes accruing to Volvo and Scania, when 
both firms would unilaterally raise the prices of all their products by 5, 10 and 25 percent. A robust 
finding is that a hypothetical price increase by 5 percent is profitable in almost all countries. Only in 
four countries would Volvo and Scania’s joint operating profits (slightly) decrease after this 
                                                             
19 This is because the negative own-profit effect is a second order effect, since firms are already maximizing 
their own pre-merger profits. The positive effect on the merging partner B’s profit is a first order effect, 
proportional to the pre-merger markup of firm B. 
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hypothetical price increase. The highest profit increases are found in Sweden, Norway, Ireland and 
Denmark. 
A different picture emerges for a hypothetical price increase by 10 percent. On the one hand, 
such a price increase is unprofitable for nine countries. On the other hand, for markets where the price 
increase is profitable, it is  frequently more profitable than the 5 percent increase. This is most notably 
true in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. This conclusion extends to the considered large price 
increase of 25 percent. Such a price increase is only profitable in Sweden, but the profit increase is 
larger. 
One may also interpret the results in Table 4 in terms of the market definition based on the 
SSNIP test. Following the rule that the relevant market is the minimum number of firms that can 
profitably raise prices by 5 percent, the merging firms by themselves constitute the relevant market in 
twelve out of the sixteen countries. Modifying the rule to a 10 percent price increase (the upper bound 
in the European Notice), the merging firms still constitute the relevant market in seven out of the 
sixteen countries. 
 A ranking of the countries based on the potential market power test is not inconsistent with a 
ranking in terms of the merging firms’ joint market shares. One notable difference occurs in the top 5, 
where Denmark and Ireland switch places. A main advantage of the ranking based on the potential 
market power test is, however, that one can use more explicit and transparent rules in determining the 
cut-off points at which the merger becomes potentially harmful. 20 
 
5.3 Actual market power test 
 
The above test assessed the potential of increased market power, by looking at the profitability 
of price increases without making detailed assumptions about post-merger firm behavior. The test is 
conservative in that it underestimates the profitability of price increases in two respects. First, it 
considers a percentage price increase that is the same for all products of the merging partners. In 
practice, the merging firms will typically find it optimal to increase the prices of their products by 
different amounts. The profitability of optimal price increases is thus typically larger. Second, the test 
ignores responses by competitors. In practice, competitors may respond to a price increase by also 
raising their prices. This is most obviously the case if the merger triggers collusive responses by the 
other firms; in this case price matching could be complete. Yet also if the rivals behave non-
cooperatively, one may expect positive – albeit incomplete – price responses. 
An alternative approach is the actual market power test, which imposes more specific 
assumptions about firm behavior after the merger. In our application we assume that firms continue to 
                                                             
20 The ranking from our potential market power test is very similar with the ranking based on the joint market 
shares. This is because the value of s is not very large here. This illustrates the usefulness of an econometric 
analysis which is able to determine the conditions under which the standard merger analysis is adequate. 
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set prices non-cooperatively after the merger. We numerically compute the post-merger Nash 
equilibrium, with a modified ownership structure, and compare this to the pre-merger Nash 
equilibrium. This amounts to solving a system of 14 pricing and demand equations, to obtain the 
equilibrium prices and quantities of the 14 products. 21 We do not consider the possibility that behavior 
shifts from non-cooperative before the merger to something more collusive after the merger. 
Table 5 shows the predicted price increases after the merger between Volvo and Scania in the 
various countries. The first two columns show the equilibrium price increases by Volvo and Scania for 
their rigid and tractor trucks (sales weighted averages). The last two columns show the average 
equilibrium price responses by the competitors. Generally speaking, Volvo and Scania are predicted to 
increase their prices by more than 10 percent in several countries, in particular the Nordic countries 
and Ireland. Note the fairly large price increase in the UK, one of the largest European countries. The 
predicted price responses by the competitors are positive, but quite small. Most firms in most countries 
respond by negligible price increases or price increases by less than 1 percent. 
Using the predicted post-merger prices, we calculate various components of welfare. We 
consider changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and total welfare. Because prices necessarily 
increase, consumer surplus will generally decrease and producer surplus will increase after the merger. 
Total welfare may either decrease or increase.22 
Table 6 shows the results. Decreases in consumer surplus may be viewed as increases in an 
industry price index. Consumer surplus decreases especially in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and 
Denmark (decreases by 5 percent or more). Producer surplus especially increases in the same 
countries. Total welfare drops in all countries, despite the output reallocation effect implied by the 
price increases by the merging firms. The largest welfare decreases again obtain in the same five 
countries. 
 
5.4 Accounting for efficiencies 
 
The potential and actual market power tests applied above can be used without a need to 
modify current European merger principles. This implies several possible restrictions on quantifying 
the economic effects. A first limitation is that the analysis does not explic itly consider the presence of 
efficiencies. The simulated merger only induces the partners to take into account the effect of a price 
increase on each other’s sales. As a result, the post-merger Nash equilibrium will necessarily entail 
higher prices than the pre-merger Nash equilibrium. To appropriately interpret the results from a 
simulated merger absent efficiencies, the policy maker should therefore keep in mind a general 
                                                             
21 Recall that there are 7 firms and 2 groups of product. 
22 An increase in total welfare may obtain, even absent efficiencies, because of an output reallocation effect to 
the outsider firms. This effect is beneficial if social value of the outsiders’ products is sufficiently high, which 
occurs if they have a high market share in equilibrium. See Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for an analysis in a 
Cournot model. 
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tolerance level regarding price increases absent efficiencies. This tolerance level may be based on a 
general (implicit) presumption regarding the average size of efficiencies expected from mergers. (See 
Fisher and Lande, 1983, and Röller, Stennek and Verboven, 1999). 
An alternative approach is to explicitly consider the possibility of cost savings in the merger 
simulation. These possible cost-savings may then be confronted with the actual cost-savings claimed 
by the merging parties. Table 7 considers such an analysis for hypothetical 5 and 10 percent cost 
reductions and compared to the status quo (0 percent).23 It shows that a 5 percent cost reduction 
increases consumer surplus in four of the sixteen countries, whereas a 10 percent cost reduction 
increases consumer surplus in 8 of the sixteen countries. Similar findings obtain for total welfare. 
These results provide an idea of the minimum required efficiencies for consumer surplus and total 
welfare to increase. These findings may be confronted with any possible findings on the actual amount 
of efficiencies to be expected from the merger. 
 
5.3 Comparison to alternative mergers 
 
The potential and actual market power tests are also limited because they only analyze the 
effects from the actual merger. A more relevant and frequently ignored question in the merger decision 
process is what will happen next. For example, if cost-savings in the form of returns to scale are 
claimed, it seems reasonable to expect that other firms with similar scale may propose further mergers. 
It may sometimes even be difficult for the competition agency to block the second merger if the first 
merger was allowed. In our application, the question of alternative sequential mergers is especially 
important from an international European integration perspective. The proposed merger is a regional 
one, meaning that the two merging firms’ market shares are strongly correlated across countries. If the 
merger would be approved, then a second regional merger should likely to be approved as well if the 
same criteria are applied. 
We first ask what will happen when two regional mergers will obtain: Volvo/Scania followed 
by Renault/Iveco. We then compare this to the alternative that these two regional mergers are blocked 
in favor of two pan-European mergers: Volvo/Renault and Scania/Iveco. All four firms have 
comparable European level sales, so that scale economies should be comparable. The results are 
shown in Table 8. 
The first column in Table 8 show that the two regional mergers (absent efficiencies) reduce 
consumer surplus by more than 3 percent in most countries, and by more than 5 percent in five 
countries. The four firms involved in the two regional mergers effectively succeed in dividing the 
market, with regional blocks being formed. The second column considers the two pan-European 
                                                             
23 The percentage cost reduction applies to the average of the marginal costs across countries. Since the 
estimated marginal costs may differ across countries (because of local costs), the percentage cost reductions may 
actually differ across countries. 
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mergers. Even though the same firms are involved, the merger effects are considerably smaller for 
most countries. The reduction in consumer surplus is larger than 3 percent in only six countries, and 
larger than 5 percent in only 2 countries. Similar conclusions can be drawn from looking at the total 
welfare effects from the merger.24 
At the time of the Volvo/Scania decision, the Commission did not yet know which alternative 
merger sequences would happen afterwards. But note that our hypothetical experiment was partly 
implemented since Volvo and Renault merged just a few months later. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 Using the Volvo/Scania case as a background, we have shown how the econometrics of 
differentiated products markets can be performed and applied to help European antitrust authorities in 
their investigation of mergers. We hope to have shown that this technique is a fruitful tool to evaluate 
the issues at stake and to account for effects that are otherwise very hard to measure, like actions of 
rival firms in terms of price and strategy, cost efficiencies and alternative merger sequences. We have 
used both tests that can be applied using the current European merger principles, and tests that would 
require some changes in European merger legislation. 
The model involves assumptions about cost conditions, demand conditions and market 
equilibrium. All together they produce a model that is parsimonious in the number of parameters to be 
estimated. This approach is necessary given European merger investigations provide rather limited 
time to collect data and perform a quantitative analysis. However, we believe that the model still 
provides a good approximation of the working of the heavy truck market and that the assumptions are 
favorable to the merging firms. In other words, our chosen simplifying assumptions tend to generate 
either unbiased or conservative estimates of the merger effects on prices and welfare. We now review 
the role of these assumptions. 
 
Cost assumptions 
It is assumed that marginal cost is constant, i.e., independent of output. The predicted price 
increases arising from the merger would be stronger if marginal costs were decreasing in output. 25 In 
contrast, the price effects would be weaker in the reverse case of increasing marginal costs (a capacity 
                                                             
24 The reader interested by the industry already knows that the merger between Renault and Volvo has not been 
blocked.  
25 This is because an increase in price implies a lower production, which in turn implies a higher marginal cost 
under decreasing marginal costs. The price effect would, however, be less than proportional to marginal cost, 
since marginal costs are passed on incompletely. 
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constrained industry). In fact, it is rather unlikely that marginal costs are increasing, given the cyclical 
nature of the market and the need for firms to invest in a sufficient amount of capacity ex ante. 
The model neither estimates fixed costs nor assesses fixed cost savings. Since the primary 
interest of the competition agency is in the price or consumer surplus effects, this assumption does not 
affect our analysis. 
 
Demand assumptions 
The demand side of the model is based on the multinomial nested logit model, which 
generates the following substitution pattern. When the price of one product increases by one percent, it 
increases the demand for the other products within the same segment by an equal percentage, whereas 
it increases the demand for products in a different segment by a lower percentage. Intuitively, the 
nested logit model thus imposes symmetric substitution patterns within a segment, yet it allows for 
asymmetric substitution patterns across segments, while remaining parsimonious in the number of 
parameters to be estimated. Moreover, the assumptions of the multinomial nested logit model 
regarding the substitution patterns may be viewed as favorable to the merging firms regarding the 
predicted price effects arising from the merger for two reasons. First, all products are symmetric 
substitutes within a segment, whereas a separate investigation described in the Commission’s Decision 
concluded that the merging firms are likely to be closer substitutes. If this is true, our analysis would 
underestimate the price effects. Second, the elasticities are increasing in prices, while in the 
econometric antitrust literature, one often either assumes constant elasticities, or otherwise performs 
simulation analysis after with a “linearized” model assuming elasticities do not change. When price 
changes are large, the assumption of constant elasticities or the “linearization” may yield significantly 
higher price effects. 
The model is usually described as a discrete choice model, in which each consumer buys a 
single truck. The model can be straightforwardly reinterpreted to describe demand behavior whereby 
each consumer buys more than one truck, but still a fixed number of the same brand. Recently, it has 
been shown that the discrete choice model can also be re-interpreted as a representative consumer 
model, in which one consumer has a taste for diversity and decides to purchase multiple brands of 
trucks (see e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1994, for the logit model). 
When truck manufacturers are selling trucks in large amount to transport firms, they may find 
it optimal to apply discounts. Our econometric model at least partially control for discounts. First, the 
model includes firm-specific and country-specific dummy variables, thereby controlling for firm- and 
country-specific discounts. Furthermore, the econometric error term in the demand equation may be 
interpreted as capturing product-specific price measurement error, which we incorporated by applying 
instrumental variables (Berry, 1994). However the model does not allow for individual-specific 
quantity discounts. From a theoretical point of view only a few studies have looked to competition 
with nonlinear pricing and asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Generally speaking, it 
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seems fair to say that competition may limit the feasibility of quantity discounts. Hence a merger, 
which reduces the number of competitors, could create the potential for more price discriminating 
discounts. This would imply a greater loss in consumer surplus, since the manufacturers can extract 
more to their own gain. Note that quantity discounting also raises consumer switching costs, since it 
induces consumers to stay with the same firm. Indeed, at the equilibrium, discounts must be such that 
the consumer has no incentive to leave for a competing contract, in addition to be incentive-
compatible and individually rational. (See Ivaldi and Martimort, 1994.) 
 
Conduct assumptions 
The model assumes that the competition between firms selects a static Nash equilibrium. 
However, alternative equilibrium concepts may well be more realistic in some situations. For example, 
the merger may facilitate collusive behavior, whereby firms behave cooperatively rather than non-
cooperatively. Second, the merger may trigger other mergers. The price effects of such other mergers 
may especially be large in a more concentrated industry. 
 Summing up, several assumptions can be debatable. Nevertheless, care has been taken so that 
the assumptions will lead to no clear bias, or in fact lead to conservative estimates of the price effects. 
Furthermore, it is because we have a quantified model that one is able to assess the effects of the 
assumptions. Here we have just provided an example to illustrate how quantification can help the 
effectiveness of economic evidence. 
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Figure 1: The choice set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Market shares per country in 1998 
 
 Daf Daimler Iveco Man Renault Scania Volvo 
AU 5 18 6 34 4 16 12 
BE 17 18 6 11 8 17 23 
DK 4 18 7 10 3 30 29 
FI 0 10 4 3 18 31 34 
FR 8 16 8 5 38 9 14 
GE 5 42 6 26 2 9 8 
GR 3 36 2 12 3 17 24 
IR 13 9 8 6 3 27 22 
IT 4 16 41 6 9 12 12 
LU 15 28 8 14 10 15 11 
NE 33 12 3 9 3 23 16 
NO 4 9 2 12 1 32 38 
PO 14 12 7 6 17 19 25 
SP 9 19 20 8 19 16 13 
SW 2 6 0 0 1 46 45 
UK 18 9 9 7 6 19 18 
EEA 11 21 11 13 12 16 15 
Source: Commission Decision, based on the Notification. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of main parameters of interest 
 Potential market factor 
 r = 0.5 r = 3.0 
 Estimates Standard error Estimates Standard error 
a  0.312 0.092 0.280 0.094 
s  0.341 0.240 0.304 0.240 
 
Truck models 
Rigids Tractors Outside good 
… … 
Truck models 
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Table 3: Price elasticity of total market demand 
 
 Potential market factor 
 r = 0.5 r = 3.0 
Austria -0.49 -1.53 
Belgium -0.49 -1.11 
Denmark -0.47 -1.02 
Finland -0.38 -0.98 
France -0.44 -1.17 
Germany -0.53 -1.52 
Greece -0.28 -0.63 
Ireland -0.34 -1.05 
Italy -0.61 -1.63 
Luxembourg -0.41 -0.94 
Netherlands -0.59 -1.54 
Norway -0.56 -1.14 
Portugal -0.46 -1.21 
Spain -0.44 -1.22 
Sweden -0.44 -0.96 
United Kingdom -0.56 -1.27 
Note:The price elasticity of total market demand in this 
differentiated product model is defined as the percentage 
change in total demand for trucks when the prices of all trucks 
increase by one percent. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Potential market power test 
 
 Profit change of merging firms 
from alternative price increases 
Price increase 5 10 25 
Austria -0.70 -5.96 -35.09 
Belgium 1.05 0.49 -8.63 
Denmark 1.63 2.09 -2.25 
Finland 2.51 2.98 -4.89 
France 0.18 -1.40 -13.86 
Germany -0.23 -2.79 -19.70 
Greece 1.39 -0.02 -14.49 
Ireland 2.12 1.70 -10.02 
Italy -1.14 -7.63 -41.79 
Luxembourg -0.07 -1.51 -11.86 
Netherlands 0.77 -2.47 -26.70 
Norway 2.74 3.58 -2.37 
Portugal 1.16 -0.12 -13.37 
Spain 0.23 -2.05 -18.65 
Sweden 2.95 4.91 5.67 
United Kingdom 1.28 0.49 -11.04 
European Union 1.00 -0.49 -14.32 
Note: Profit effects are based on the parameter estimates of scenario 2 
( 3.0r = ). The numbers are normalized such that the average percent 
profit change in the European Union under a 5 percent price increase 
is equal to one. 
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Table 5: Percent price changes after merger 
 
 Volvo/Scania Competitors 
 Rigid Tractor Rigid Tractor 
Austria 1.69 2.15 0.05 0.08 
Belgium 6.75 5.41 0.14 0.16 
Denmark 11.55 8.17 0.26 0.19 
Finland 10.03 7.83 0.39 0.24 
France 2.97 2.97 0.09 0.08 
Germany 1.65 2.19 0.04 0.06 
Greece 4.98 5.39 0.25 0.26 
Ireland 10.87 7.36 0.21 0.30 
Italy 2.02 1.49 0.07 0.07 
Luxembourg 3.33 1.65 0.05 0.05 
Netherlands 3.56 3.47 0.21 0.16 
Norway 13.17 8.63 0.32 0.28 
Portugal 6.67 5.06 0.19 0.12 
Spain 3.65 2.98 0.06 0.08 
Sweden 22.34 12.64 0.47 0.32 
United Kingdom 7.15 4.79 0.27 0.12 
Note: The predictions are based on the parameter estimates of 
scenario 2 ( 3.0r = ). All numbers are sales-weighted percentage 
changes. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Welfare analysis of the merger 
 
 Pre-merger 
consumer 
surplus 
Change in 
consumer 
surplus (%) 
Pre-merger 
industry 
profit 
Change in 
industry profit 
(%) 
Pre-merger 
total welfare 
Change in 
total welfare 
(%) 
Austria 100.0 -1.09 65.8 0.77 165.8 -0.35 
Belgium 97.8 -3.05 63.9 1.73 161.6 -1.16 
Denmark 97.4 -6.02 65.6 2.78 163.0 -2.48 
Finland 98.6 -8.44 67.9 3.65 166.6 -3.51 
France 98.9 -1.04 65.7 0.71 164.6 -0.34 
Germany 99.5 -0.62 67.9 0.45 167.4 -0.19 
Greece 97.7 -3.46 68.3 1.80 166.0 -1.30 
Ireland 99.9 -7.00 66.6 3.33 166.5 -2.87 
Italy 99.0 -1.03 66.9 0.71 165.9 -0.33 
Luxembourg 97.8 -0.59 68.4 0.38 166.2 -0.19 
Netherlands 98.8 -2.85 67.1 1.68 165.9 -1.02 
Norway 96.9 -10.71 69.0 3.78 165.8 -4.68 
Portugal 98.9 -3.34 64.1 1.92 163.0 -1.27 
Spain 99.2 -1.39 63.7 0.94 162.9 -0.48 
Sweden 97.4 -17.77 73.2 4.89 170.5 -8.05 
UK 97.8 -3.77 64.5 2.05 162.3 -1.46 
Notes: The monetary values (consumer surplus, industry profit and total welfare) are normalized such that 
consumer surplus in Austria is equal to 100. The calculations are based on the parameter estimates of scenario 2 
( 3.0r = ). 
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Table 7: Welfare analysis in the presence of cost efficiencies 
 
 Change in consumer surplus Change in total welfare 
 Cost efficiency of Cost efficiency of 
 0 % 5 % 10 % 0 % 5 % 10 % 
Austria -1.09 0.02 1.19 -0.35 0.01 0.44 
Belgium -3.05 -1.41 0.31 -1.16 -0.56 0.14 
Denmark -6.02 -4.25 -2.42 -2.48 -1.79 -1.03 
Finland -8.44 -6.93 -5.37 -3.51 -2.93 -2.29 
France -1.04 0.10 1.29 -0.34 0.04 0.48 
Germany -0.62 0.24 1.15 -0.19 0.08 0.39 
Greece -3.46 -2.06 -0.60 -1.30 -0.80 -0.24 
Ireland -7.00 -5.15 -3.24 -2.87 -2.16 -1.38 
Italy -1.03 -0.02 1.04 -0.33 0.00 0.38 
Luxembourg -0.59 0.24 1.11 -0.19 0.08 0.39 
Netherlands -2.85 -1.30 0.32 -1.02 -0.48 0.14 
Norway -10.71 -8.95 -7.14 -4.68 -3.96 -3.19 
Portugal -3.34 -1.78 -0.15 -1.27 -0.70 -0.05 
Spain -1.39 -0.20 1.06 -0.48 -0.07 0.41 
Sweden -17.77 -15.89 -13.95 -8.05 -7.23 -6.38 
UK -3.77 -2.13 -0.41 -1.46 -0.85 -0.15 
Note: The calculations are based on the parameter estimates of scenario 2 ( 3.0r = ). 
 
 
 
Table 8: Alternative merger sequences 
 
 Change in consumer surplus Change in total welfare 
 Two regional 
mergers 
Two pan-European 
mergers 
Two regional 
mergers 
Two pan-European 
mergers 
Austria -1.24 -0.88 -0.40 -0.27 
Belgium -3.31 -1.88 -1.25 -0.66 
Denmark -6.23 -2.30 -2.54 -0.82 
Finland -8.93 -5.53 -3.67 -2.09 
France -3.48 -4.58 -1.26 -1.74 
Germany -0.72 -0.60 -0.21 -0.17 
Greece -3.46 0.00 -1.30 0.00 
Ireland -7.23 -2.59 -2.94 -0.91 
Italy -4.10 -4.37 -1.52 -1.64 
Luxembourg -1.31 -1.49 -0.42 -0.48 
Netherlands -2.91 -0.78 -1.04 -0.25 
Norway -10.73 -0.75 -4.69 -0.26 
Portugal -4.25 -3.90 -1.57 -1.42 
Spain -4.11 -4.03 -1.47 -1.43 
Sweden -17.78 -0.37 -8.05 -0.13 
UK -4.35 -3.00 -1.64 -1.07 
Notes: The calculations are based on the parameter estimates of scenario 2 ( 3.0r = ). 
 
 
